Most Australians were repatriated home by the end of 1919. Southern Turkey, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and Gallipoli were involved in law-enforcement actions in Syria, occupied territories until civil government was re-constituted. This ended with the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. There was order to be maintained in the Middle East Theatre did not end with the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. There was order to be maintained in the Middle East Theatre.

Dr Baker summarises the traditional view of the Treaty of Versailles as taught in Australian schools, outlines his recent research, and describes Australia’s foreign policy during the Great War, especially the role played by our prime minister, William Morris Hughes, at the peace conference. He concludes that the sins of Versailles were not all the fault of the European powers— as far as the Pacific was concerned, Australia was more than complicit.

Gordon Lindsay Maitland was an Honorary Life Member and Councillor Emeritus of the Institute who had served as its President from 1995 – 1998.

This book deals with the origins and development of Australia’s intelligence services from Federation to 1945 and reveals the birth of Australia’s political intelligence capabilities.

This book describes the Allied bombing of German forces in France during World War II, addressing both the strategic bombing campaign and the tactical support of the Allied invasion.

Daesh describes the rise and fall of Islamic State’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria and also the global spread of franchise terrorism under the Islamic State (Daesh) banner between 2006 and 2017.
President’s Column

Welcome to the March 2019 issue of United Service. A professional journal, it contains interesting papers on protecting Australia’s sea routes, post-World War 1 operations in Russia and the Middle East, and Australia’s role in the Treaty of Versailles and its effects on the post-war Pacific, plus significant book reviews. I am sure you will enjoy reading it.

At the end of 2018, we were advised that Pinnacle Publishing Pty Ltd, which had published the paper version of United Service for many years, was closing down. Expressions of interest in publishing the paper version were invited from 11 publishers of similar journals and negotiations were held with six potential publishers. Regrettably, we were not able to secure a cost-effective solution to publishing United Service in hard copy, so we determined to continue publishing it online only.

Following the public opening of the Centenary Extension of the Anzac Memorial in Hyde Park South in Sydney on Armistice Day 2018, we have been operating the Ursula Davidson Library and the Institute from our new premises in the Centenary Extension. The library’s reading room has been fitted out to a high standard and is now open to our members and the public. We also utilise the new auditorium in the Centenary Extension to hold our lectures and seminars, and our relations with staff of the Anzac Memorial are very good.

For the first time in almost 131 years, we have a permanent home in a prestigious building in the Sydney CBD. Our members and the public can access the library for educational and research purposes, thus increasing our interaction with the wider community. It also enhances the educational role of the Anzac Memorial and we consider that it is a wonderful gift to the people of New South Wales to mark the centenary of the end of the Great War.

The benefits of interaction with members of the public are significant. We are raising the profile of the work of the Institute, leading to an increase in membership and also of donations of books to the library.

Finally, can I express my warmest congratulations to all members of United Services Institutes across Australia who received an award in the Australia Day 2019 Honours List and also to our Patron, His Excellency, General The Honourable David Hurley, AC, DSC (Ret’d), Governor of New South Wales.

Paul Irving
INSTITUTE NEWS

Australia Day Honours 2019
The Institute congratulates the following nine members who were recognised in the 2019 Australia Day Honours:

Appointed an Officer (AO) in the General Division of the Order of Australia
Kathryn Jan Campbell CSC Sutton, NSW, for distinguished service to public administration through senior roles with government departments, and to the Australian Army Reserve – Major General Campbell became a vice-patron of the Institute on her appointment as Commander 2nd Division in December 2018.

Appointed an Officer (AO) in the Military Division of the Order of Australia
Major General Stephen Hugh Porter AM QLD, for distinguished service to the Australian Army and transformation of the Army Reserve through his significant contributions as Commander 2nd Division – Major General Porter was a vice-patron of the Institute during his term as Commander 2nd Division.

Appointed a Member (AM) in the General Division of the Order of Australia
Colonel John Sutherland Haynes OAM (Ret’d) Randwick, NSW, for significant service to veterans, particularly through the National Boer War Memorial Association.

Lynette Silver OAM Wahroonga, NSW, for significant service to the community through historical battlefield tours and commemorative services.

Awarded a Medal (OAM) in the General Division of the Order of Australia
Lieutenant Colonel David Jonathan Deasey RFD (Ret’d) Mortdale, NSW, for service to community history.

Lieutenant Colonel John Howells RFD (Ret’d) NSW, for service to community history.

Robert William Joseph Bella Vista, NSW, for service to the community.

Craig Antony Laffin Richmond, NSW, for service to the community – Mr Laffin is an honorary life member of the Institute.

Lieutenant Colonel Antony William Larnach-Jones (Ret’d) Mosman, NSW, for service to community history.

Upcoming Events
March Lunchtime-Lecture
Tuesday, 26 March 2019, at 1.00 – 2.00 pm
The Auditorium, Anzac Memorial, Hyde Park South, Sydney
Speaker: Dr Thomas Wilkins
Senior Lecturer, China Studies Centre, University of Sydney
Senior Visiting Fellow, Japan Institute for International Affairs
Subject: “Australia’s approach to Asia-Pacific regionalism”

April Lunchtime-Lecture
Tuesday, 30 April 2019, at 1.00 – 2.00 pm
The Auditorium, Anzac Memorial, Hyde Park South, Sydney
Speaker: to be advised
Subject: to be advised

May Lunchtime-Lecture
Tuesday, 28 May 2019, at 1.00 pm – 2.00 pm

The Auditorium, Anzac Memorial, Hyde Park South, Sydney
Speaker: to be advised
Subject: to be advised

Battlefield Tours
Sandakan-Ranau Death March Remembrance Day Trek, 3-14 November 2019: The 12-day itinerary includes six days of walking along a 95km section of the track escorted by Institute historian Lynette Silver AM (lynettesilver@gmail.com). Accommodation is good standard (no camping).
Price: $3200 per person, twin share, plus airfares.
Trek details: https://sandakandeathmarch.com/tours/challenge-highlights-challenge-tour/
Bookings: Roz Martindale, North Shore Travel: 02 9418 2546; 0402 081 104.

LETTERS

The significance of the Battle of Jutland
I enjoyed reading United Service 61 (4) (December 2018) and in particular Josh Abbey’s interesting article on the significance of the Battle of Jutland (pp. 25 – 28). Indeed, the Zimmerman Telegram and the sinking of American merchant vessels did cause America to enter the war. In the International Encyclopaedia of the First World War, we are reminded of the banking connection, i.e. as United States manufacturing capacity grew at a staggering pace during the period 1914–1918 due to essential exports to Britain, so too did British debt – to approximately US$400 million. It was not necessarily clear to the United States that this debt could be repaid – especially if the Allies failed in their strategic objectives. The entry of America into the war ensured that the debt would, or indeed, could be repaid.

In a nutshell, in our analysis of war, we generally tend to focus on the blood, sweat, hardware and tactics, and fail to consider the role of cross-border (financial) exposure.

James Ayliffe
Tasmania, 8 December 2018

Robotics in Future Land Warfare
After reading Major-General Kathryn Toohey’s paper on robotics (United Service 69 (4), 9 – 12, December 2018), I deduced that the Army has adopted a philosophy of ‘man the arm’ rather than ‘arm the man’; implying a strategy of attrition in any future warfare – fight to the last machine i.e. grind down an enemy’s resources until he no longer has any capacity to fight.

As David Kilcullen has remarked (quoted by General Toohey), drones and robots can give soldiers a powerful edge in battle against other soldiers, when they can direct drone airstrikes onto enemy troops and equipment. If so, a few special forces soldiers with radios might control a vast area of the battlefield using drones. This implies ‘no surrender’ tactics, as enemy soldiers will not get a chance to surrender before being obliterated by drone strikes. That could harden enemy resolve and render any peace settlement less attainable.

If General Toohey’s lecture does imply that attrition may become Army policy, I think the Army, while investigating robotic devices for tactical employment, might be less enthusiastic about their effects on strategy in warfare.

Denis Ashly Ross
Sunnybank Hills, Queensland, 23 December 2018

1 https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_finance_great_britain_and_ireland

United Service 70 (1) March 2019
Indonesia, the TNI and regional security

For the half-century following independence, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) focused on maintaining law and order across the archipelago of some 1700 islands and on security threats, such as piracy, in the Strait of Malacca. That emphasis is now changing. Over the last decade or so since the restoration of democracy, the aspiration of national governments has been that the TNI should progressively transfer responsibility for internal security to the police services and instead focus outwards on national defence and regional security.

As a result of this policy change, significant steps are now being made in broadening the scope of the TNI from an internal security-focused land-based army into a regionally-significant maritime power. Concurrently, the TNI is strengthening its eastern flank in the Timor Sea, Arafura Sea, Celebes Sea and Pacific Ocean. New bases are planned in eastern Indonesia with a view to forming a new Eastern Command, which would be the TNI’s third geographic command. In some quarters, this is referred to as ‘eastern balancing’.

Last December, Indonesia opened a new military base located strategically in the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea between Borneo and peninsula Malaysia. The base will host composite battalions from the army and marines, as well as numerous advanced platforms from submarines, unmanned aerial vehicles and warships, to fighter jets, missile systems and supporting infrastructure.

The Natuna base will strengthen Indonesia’s position, including border security, in the North Natuna Sea and will facilitate force projection into the South China Sea. It also will send a strong message to China. China has some vaguely-defined territorial claims in the area and has been in dispute with Indonesia over illegal fishing by Chinese fishermen in Natuna Island waters, a dispute which flared in 2016 and 2017.

According to the Eurasian Review of 4 February 2019, Indonesia plans to further strengthen its eastern flank by building bases for tri-service integrated units in Saumlaki, Morotai, Biak, and Merauke; and by establishing the 3rd Infantry Division (Army Strategic Reserve Command) in South Sulawesi, the Navy’s 3rd Armada Command and 3rd Marine Force in Western Papua, and the Air Force’s 3rd Operational Command in Papua. Further, the number of major fleet units in the Navy is projected to increase to 12 submarines and 13 frigates/destroyers by 2025.

These, though, are still early days. As Indian defence analyst and retired vice-admiral, A. K. Singh, has advised the Institute’s special interest group on strategy, Indonesia will now need to invest much more in enhancing the numbers and combat capability of their navy and air force, while also increasing maritime co-operation with India, Australia and other neighbours.

Nevertheless, the Natuna base and the eastern balancing are important first steps. With our region increasingly the subject of great power competition, the emergence of Indonesia as a regional ally would be a welcome development.

David Leece¹

LETTERS

Robotics in Future Land Warfare

(Continued from previous page)

The paper by Major-General Kathryn Toohey on robotics and autonomy as part of future land warfare (United Service 69 (4), 9-12, December 2018) was most timely and thoughtful. As Toohey pointed out, robotics has the potential to change warfare.

In 2005, I published a paper titled “Unmanned tele-operated robots as medical support on the battlefield” [R. Atkinson et al., ADF Health 5 (1), 34-37]. This was a progression from research on the lower leg physical model for survivability against landmines, and related to the Bushmaster Project.

 Australians have a history of being inventive ‘niche marketers’. While not able to produce the next best fighter plane, we can make it better. We also gain a seat at the high-tech table, for our innovation and technology (along with our values). I would encourage the development of robotics in its broader sense, under a leader such as Kathryn Toohey.

Rob Atkinson
Orthopaedic surgeon, University of Adelaide
24 January 2019

¹The TNI consists of the Army (TNI-AD), the Navy (TNI-AL) and Air Force (TNI-AU).

²Dr David Leece, editor of United Service, is chair of the Institute’s Special Interest Group on Strategy. These are his personal views.

Marcus Fielding
Melbourne, 5 February 2019
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

Protecting Australia’s sea routes

A paper based on a presentation to the Institute on 30 October 2018 by

Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead, AM, RAN
Commander Australian Fleet

The Australian Fleet is central to the attainment of Australia’s three key strategic interests. In 2018, Fleet units and task groups deployed in support of these strategic interests throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans – as far afield as the Middle East. Fleet capabilities also are being upgraded and expanded, with the introduction of unmanned aerial systems to the Fleet, and, looking forward, with new classes of both frigates and offshore patrol vessels to be acquired.

Key words: Australia; Australian navy; Indo-Pacific region; sea routes; sea lines of communication; maritime trade routes; naval operations; naval exercises; fleet capabilities.

Australia’s maritime domain is large and complex. Sharing no land borders with other nations and possessing 36,000 kilometres of coastline, the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone (AEEZ) is the third largest in the world covering 4 per cent of the earth’s surface.

Australia is a maritime nation with an economy underpinned by international ocean-borne trade; and the sea is the most efficient highway for much of our domestic coastal trading. In 2015–16, 5540 uniquely identified cargo ships made a total of 30,056 port calls, importing goods worth AUD201.8 billion and exporting goods worth AUD218.9 billion. Australia relies on sea transport for 99 per cent of our exports; and, in terms of tonnes of cargo shipped and kilometres travelled, Australia is the world’s fifth-largest shipping nation.

As a maritime nation, the importance of maritime security and open sea lines of communication are paramount to our national economy and economic prosperity; and, in accordance with various international conventions, we are obligated to provide a safe, secure, environmentally-sound, efficient and sustainable shipping environment.

In Australia, the maritime environment is front and centre of our defence strategy. In the 2016 Defence White Paper, Australia promotes three key strategic interests. In each, the importance of the maritime environment is self-evident:

• “... a secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication;
• a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and the South Pacific; and
• a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order”.

As a result, in 2017, Australia released its Naval Shipbuilding Plan which outlines the Commonwealth Government’s vision for the Australian naval shipbuilding enterprise and the significant investment required in coming decades in order to meet these interests.

So what role does the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) play in protecting our maritime trade? I think the best way to look at this is to look at what the Fleet has been doing over the last year.

Fleet Activities in 2018

The last 12 months has been a very busy time for the Australian Fleet at sea. Even today (30 October 2018), 22 of our ships with 1918 men and women are deployed around Australia and further abroad. We are busier than we have ever been and we continue to meet and exceed the demands placed on us. Whether in Australian waters or abroad, the image we project and our presence are instrumental in protecting Australia’s sea routes.

Operations

Last month, HMAS Ballarat crash-sailed for a search-and-rescue mission in the Indian Ocean. Just 24 hours prior, her ship’s company had proceeded on leave as she prepared to deploy for 9 months to the Middle East Region. With 8-hours’ notice, the crew were recalled and sailed 1500 nautical miles to aid in the rescue of two stranded sailors.

While Ballarat prepares to deploy for Operation Manitou, earlier this year we welcomed home Warramunga – the 66th ship to return from the Middle East Region. Warramunga made a significant impact on terrorist and criminal organisations by denying them approximately $2.2 billion in funding from illegal narcotics – seizing around 31.8 tonnes of hashish and 2 tonnes of heroin. Throughout the 9-months deployment, Warramunga operated with 27 international ships, visited 12 ports, conducted 32 flag verification boardings, 19 escort taskings and 15 replenishments-at-sea. Her MH-60R Seahawk helicopter flew 182 sorties and spent almost 520 hours in the sky.

Closer to home, in August this year, the Australian Defence Vessel Cape Fourcroy joined a multi-agency task force off the northern coast of New South Wales to intercept a drug smuggling vessel in our own waters. Along with the Federal Police, Queensland Police and

1Email: jonathan.mead@defence.gov.au
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the boat, crewed by the RAN, assisted in the arrest of two men and the seizure of more than 600 kilogrammes of cocaine bound for the Australian drug market.

Duration and Frequency of Deployments

The length of deployments is increasing, too. Seven-to-nine month deployments are becoming common. Last month, HMAS Toowoomba completed a 7-month deployment to South East Asia, the South West Pacific and the United States. During her trip, she sailed over 40,000 nautical miles, equivalent to 1.85 times around the world.

HMAS Melbourne is 5 months into a 7-month deployment – participating in seven back-to-back exercises and regional engagements. I caught up with Melbourne last month as she sailed into Zhenjiang for a port visit and she now is making her way to South Korea and Japan.

The length of our deployments has not only increased but also the frequency. Only two years ago, we deployed our first task group – this year, we had two task groups concurrently deployed which saw over 3000 personnel at sea each day for a 2-week period. Not bad for a Navy of only 14,000 sailors.

Indo-Pacific Endeavour

Perhaps one of most successful deployments of 2018 has been Indo-Pacific Endeavour – a major annual maritime activity that delivers on the promise of the 2016 Defence White Paper to deepen Australia’s engagement and partnerships with regional security forces.

Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2018, between June and September, saw HMA Ships Adelaide, Melbourne, Toowoomba and Success, constitute a task group and undertake a 3-month journey across the Pacific, working with Pacific Island partners in support of regional prosperity and security. Collectively, they visited Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands conducting numerous community service and engagement activities.

Minehunters

This year has certainly been a year of firsts and lasts. Three weeks ago, I farewelled minehunters, Huon and Gascoyne, as they deployed to South Korea and Japan – the furthest ships of this class have deployed in 70 years. We will continue to deploy our minehunters further afield so that they develop their skills in a wide range of environments and learn from the foreign navies with which they will interact.

Fleet Replenishment Ships

Our oldest ship, HMAS Success, celebrated 32 years of service and her last full year before she decommissions. Just because she is getting old, it does not mean that she is not busy. This year, she conducted a 5-month deployment through Asia and the Pacific. The deployment included visits to eight ports in seven nations, two international exercises, numerous regional engagement activities and, most impressively, 60 replenishments-at-sea.

The replacement for HMAS Success will arrive in Australia next year (2019). HMAS Supply will be the first of two new replenishment ships that will be introduced into service. The second, HMAS Stalwart, which will replace HMAS Sirius, will arrive 18 months later.

Air-Warfare Destroyers

This year, our newest ship, HMAS Hobart, embarked on her first overseas deployment – and on Sunday we will commission the second air-warfare destroyer, HMAS Brisbane. This class of ship is one of the most sophisticated and advanced warships that this nation has ever owned and will significantly change the way we combat a threat, specifically in the air-warfare sphere.

This complex warship will also challenge the way we operate. Being in the operations room of an air-warfare destroyer is truly a remarkable and almost overwhelming experience. The sheer amount of information available to a command team is something to which we will have to become accustomed.

New Fleet Capabilities

The Hunter-class Frigate

The intricacies of the air-warfare destroyer will only be matched when the Hunter-class frigate is brought into service in the late 2020s. This year our government
announced the future frigate programme – one of Australia’s most significant investments in military capability. BAE Systems will be fully responsible for the delivery of nine frigates, all being built in Australia with Australian workers. This warship will possess cutting-edge anti-submarine warfare technology, providing us unprecedented capability to detect and destroy a submarine threat and enhance our interoperability with our allies.

The first batch of three will be named HMA Ships *Flinders* (II), after the South Australian region named for explorer Captain Matthew Flinders, who was the first to circumnavigate Australia and identified it as a continent; *Hunter*, after the New South Welsh region named for Vice-Admiral John Hunter, first fleet captain and second governor of New South Wales; and *Tasman*, after the state and sea named for explorer Abel Tasman – first known European explorer to reach Tasmania, New Zealand and Fiji.

Just like the number of consoles on an air-warfare destroyer, the Hunter-class frigate brings its own unique challenges. The anti-submarine warfare equipment that we currently have on our ships is the same technology our ships had during World War II. Fundamentally, we have not changed the way we do anti-submarine warfare in about 70 years. The future frigate will be fitted with technology that we do not currently possess and the challenge will be training our people to most effectively use this equipment.

**Naval Unmanned Aerial Systems**

As we change the way we look at warfare, we are also branching out in other areas. On 25 October 2018, I commissioned 822X Squadron, our first Naval Unmanned Aerial Systems Unit. The squadron will operate two specialised unmanned aerial vehicles: the ScanEagle, a long-endurance, low altitude aircraft with a wing-span of 3.1 metres; and the Schiebel Camcopter, based on a rotorcraft design. These two assets will be primarily used for shipboard operations, where they will be employed on intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance. The squadron will also have the capacity to support other activities, such as search-and-rescue and natural-disaster recovery.

**Offshore Patrol Vessels**

In the not too distant future, we will also introduce 12 new offshore patrol vessels. While we have operated patrol vessels for a long time, these will present a unique challenge, particularly in terms of their size. Our current patrol boats are 400 tonnes and 56 metres long; our new offshore patrol vessels will be 3000 tonnes and almost 100 metres long – too big to classed as a minor war vessel. They will change the way in which we employ our force.

**Naval Aviation**

This year, HMAS *Albatross*, home to our Fleet Air Arm, celebrated the 70th anniversary of the establishment’s commissioning. Just as our ships are busier than ever, so are our aircraft. At the Sea Series exercises in June this year, we had a record-breaking Air Combat Element afloat. Along with army helicopters, there were seven aircraft embarked on HMAS *Canberra*. This is the highest number of aircraft that we have had embarked on a Royal Australian Navy ship since the aircraft carrier HMAS *Melbourne* was decommissioned 36 years ago.

The ‘Romeo’ (MH-60R) submarine hunter and anti-surface warfare helicopters are now at the forefront of our Fleet Air Arm and, since their introduction in 2013, have passed the fleet milestone of 10,000 flying-hours. They have now completed more than 3500 sorties all around the world and remain the world’s most cutting-edge and lethal anti-submarine warfare technology.

**Conclusion**

The Australian Fleet is central to the attainment of Australia’s three key strategic interests, as each has a strong maritime component. Fleet units and task groups have deployed in support of these strategic interests in 2018 throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans – as far afield as the Middle East and the United States: patrolling maritime trade routes and showing-the-flag; on operations in the Middle East; conducting border protection, disaster relief and search-and-rescue missions closer to home; exercising with allies throughout the Indo-Pacific Region; and training and supporting our neighbours in the South Pacific.

Fleet capabilities also are being upgraded and expanded, with the introduction of unmanned aerial systems to the Fleet, and, looking forward, with new classes of both frigates and offshore patrol vessels to be acquired and to begin entering into service late next decade.

**The Author:** Rear-Admiral Jonathan Mead became Commander Australian Fleet on 19 January 2018. Following graduation from the Royal Australian Naval College in 1986, he served with the fleet first as a clearance diver and then as an anti-submarine warfare officer, including in HMA Ships *Melbourne* and *Arunta*. In 2005, he took command of HMAS *Parramatta* and saw active service in the North Arabian Gulf – his ship was awarded a Meritorious Unit Citation and he was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia. After studies at the Indian National Defence College in 2007, he became Australia’s Defence Adviser to India. In 2011, he deployed to the Middle East as commander of Combined Task Force 150, responsible for maritime counter terrorism, and was awarded a Commendation for Distinguished Service. He later commanded the Surface Force then, following promotion to rear-admiral in 2015, was Head Navy Capability. He holds a master’s degree in management and a PhD in international relations. He is the author of Indian national security: misguided men and guided missiles (K W Publishers: New Delhi, 2010). [Photo of Admiral Mead: Department of Defence]
The extended war on the Eastern Front, 1918-1925: the Russian Intervention

A paper based on a presentation to the Institute on 27 November 2018 by

Bryce M. Fraser  
Military Historian  
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, New South Wales

Conflict in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East, over issues which plagued the region at the end of the Great War, continues to this day. Although considered insignificant by some historians and overshadowed by the gigantic scale of warfare during the two World Wars, the Russian Intervention was substantial and Australians played a significant role in it, two winning the Victoria Cross and one the Distinguished Service Order.

Key words: Australia; Russia; Russian Intervention, 1918-1919; North Russian Expeditionary Force; North Russian Relief Force; Murmansk; Archangel; Siberian Intervention; South Russia; Transcaucasus Intervention; Dunsterforce; Lionel Dunsterville; Stanley Savige.

The late historian Eric Hobsbawm in The Age of Extremes (Hobsbawm 1994) coined the term ‘the short twentieth century’ to describe the period of conflict in Europe from 1914 to the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, in contrast to the customary view that fighting in the Great War ended with the armistice of 11 November 1918 on the Western Front. In other European theatres and in the Middle East, there also were armistices in 1918: the September armistice in Salonica with Bulgaria; and the armistice at Mudros in October 1918, which initiated a temporary end to fighting with the Ottoman Empire, although hostilities with Turkey continued until 1923.

The events on the Eastern Front in 1918 are better understood as products of the October 1917 Bolshevik Russian revolution. The German and Ottoman armistice with the Russians at Brest Litovsk in December 1917 was followed by the Russian Civil War from February 1918 to 1922 and saw the creation of the USSR. Also, in December 1917, the Ottoman Empire signed the Erzincan armistice with the Russian authorities in Transcaucasia/north-west Persia which set the scene for Soviet rule there until 1991.

This paper will give some insight into selected events arising out of the Russian Civil War, showing how they still shape current events. There were four regions of the former Tsarist Russian Empire where Allied interventions occurred with Australian participation. These were in:

- North Russia (Murmansk and Archangel);
- Siberia;
- South Russia; and
- Transcaucasus/north-west Persia (the region north east of Mosul and Baghdad towards the Caspian Sea).

Overview of the Great War at the end of 1917 and early 1918

The chance of Allied victory in the Great War seemed precarious at the end of 1917. In October, the inconclusive battle of Passchendaele had a month to run. In the Atlantic, despite the introduction of convoys, submarine warfare was still sinking 300,000 tons of shipping per month. In Palestine, the Third Battle of Gaza was just underway. The only good news would be the Allied capture of Jerusalem on 11 December 1917. In the period from March 1918 to July 1918, the Allies still feared they might yet be beaten in Palestine and on the Western Front before United States troops could arrive and become effective.

On the Eastern Front, Russia's capacity to continue the war against Germany had weakened throughout 1917 following the February overthrow of the Czarist regime. After the Bolshevik Revolution in October, Russia signed an armistice with the Germans and adopted a neutral, even pro-German, position. The revolution, however, had many internal opponents known as White Russians. In 1918, they obtained Allied funding, advisors and equipment to campaign against the Bolsheviks and to resume the war against Germany.

The peace treaty with Germany was signed by the Bolsheviks at Brest Litovsk on 3 March 1918 after the Germans invaded southern Russia and the Ukraine, and advanced through the Baltic provinces towards St Petersburg; and Finland had seceded from Russia and accepted German support. The Bolsheviks were forced to cede territory in Finland, Poland, the Baltic provinces, Ukraine, and Bessarabia. In the Caucasus, the Bolsheviks were forced to cede to the Ottoman Empire a province in the north-east of Turkey and hitherto Russian-occupied areas of Transcaucasia and north-west Persia down to the road running east from Baghdad to the Caspian Sea at Anzali.

The German Spring offensive on the Western Front in March 1918 forced the British Empire to send reinforcements there from Allenby's Palestine front. During this time,

1 Email: brycef717@gmail.com

2 The reader can best locate places in this paper using the Google maps feature. The paper uses modern map spellings and less obvious name-changes since 1918 are indicated in squared brackets.
two unsuccessful attacks eastwards from Jerusalem were made before Allenby's force could resume the offensive when reinforced from India.

In Mesopotamia, the British resumed their offensive in late February 1918, capturing Baghdad in March and securing the western (Mesopotamian/Iraqi) end of the road to Anzali in April.

**Overview of the Allied Response to the 1917 Russian Revolutions**

The Western allies had several concerns after the two Russian revolutions in 1917. Firstly, they had delivered large quantities of military stores to the ports of Archangel, Murmansk and Vladivostok. There was a risk that these would be used by Germany or the Ottomans against them. They also hoped to support the White Russian forces in re-forming active fronts against the Germans and the Ottomans.

Secondly, they feared that Germany's February 1918 advance into Russia would capture important natural, industrial and military resources enabling Germany to evade the British North Sea blockade.

Thirdly, they needed to counter the German strategic push south-eastwards through the Ukraine to capture the oil from the Caucasus. White Russian forces might be capable, if supported, of blocking this German push.

Fourthly, it was vital to reduce the German capacity to reinforce the Western Front. Before the peace treaty with the Bolsheviks, the Germans had transferred 40 divisions. There were still 1.6 million German and Austrian prisoners-of-war in Russia who could rejoin their armies in the West (Winegard 2005).

In pursuit of these considerations, eight Allied nations intervened against the Red Army from June 1918. Within six months, the armistices of late 1918 made an Eastern Front against Germany meaningless and took the Ottomans out of the war. Allied efforts were hampered by divided objectives, war-weariness and a lack of domestic support. Over the summer of 1919, Allied forces withdrew. The Red Army defeated the White Forces in Ukraine, south Russia, and the Crimea by 1920, and in Siberia by 1923. Soviet republics were established in Transcaucasia in 1920. Japanese forces occupied parts of Siberia until 1922 and the northern half of the island of Sakhalin until 1925.

**The North Russian Expeditionary Force**

In pursuit of the objectives of the Allies, an Allied 'North Russian Expeditionary Force' (NREF) of about 14,000, including about 25-30 Australian volunteers (Grey, 1985), was landed at Murmansk in March 1918 to guard the military stores and raise and train a White Russian Army. Further landings were made at Archangel on 2 August but by then the Bolsheviks had moved the Allied war material south up the Dvina River.

A United States regimental combat team pushed back the Bolshevik forces for the next six weeks but the rapid onset of winter forced a defensive posture. During that winter, a Bolshevik offensive caused the Allies to withdraw a considerable distance.

The Australians assisted by recruiting and training former Russian soldiers, and then encouraging the resulting White Army to link up with the White Russian forces in western Siberia nearly 2000km to the south-east, and so create a new front opposing the Bolsheviks.

By the time of the Western Front armistice, the Allies had over 14,000 personnel at Murmansk and 16,000 at Archangel. The contributing nations were: Britain, Canada, France, United States, Italy, Poland, Serbia, Finland and White Russia. It was a forlorn intervention to prop up an ineffectual and already disaffected force.

**The North Russia Relief Force**

In January 1919, the British Government adopted a strategy of either a negotiated peace or a complete withdrawal of all British forces in Russia. The United States president, however, wanted a complete withdrawal (Gilbert 1992: 405-409). This was agreed and Churchill organised the North Russia Relief Force (NRRF), an 8000 strong brigade group, to mask the evacuation by launching an offensive against the local Red Army. The surprise offensive enabled all Allied forces to be evacuated by September 1919. In any case, the White Russian forces in North Russia had mutinied (and killed one Australian advisor (Grey 1985)) and had gone over to the Bolsheviks, while the White Russian Siberian forces proved unable to cross the 2300km gap to their north (Gilbert 1992: 412).

**Australians in the North Russia Relief Force**

About 200 to 300 Australians waiting in England for repatriation joined the NRRF. They were discharged from the Australian Imperial Force and enlisted to form two companies in the 45th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers and the 201st Battalion, Machine Gun Corps. When escorting the British commander for 130km south down the railway line to Moscow, they surprised the enemy during a relief of their forward blockhouses, killed 30 with the bayonet, wounded many others and set fire to the blockhouses before withdrawing. Australian Corporal Arthur Percy Sullivan was killed-in-action on 29 August and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross (Wigmore 1986:183-184). In another attack, over 3000 prisoners were taken and heavy losses inflicted. Nineteen-days later, the two Australian companies again charged the Bolsheviks and Sergeant Samuel George Pearce won the Victoria Cross (Wigmore 1986: 184-185). Grey argued that the North Russian intervention was pointless because more decisive theatres were elsewhere on the Russian peripheries (Grey 1985). He was referring to Siberia, South Russia and the Transcaucasus.

**Allied Intervention in Siberia**

Omsk, 2700km east of Moscow on the Trans-Siberian Railway, was the seat of an insecure White Russian Siberian government under Admiral Kolchak. Among Kolchak's Allied advisors were a number of Australians (Grey 1985). The railway continued a further 6400km east from Omsk to Vladivostok, the Pacific port where Allied supplies had been landed.

The Siberian Intervention of 1918–1922 was the name given to the dispatch of Allied troops to the Russian Maritime Provinces with four objectives:
1. to prevent the Allied war matériel stockpiles and rolling stock from falling into German or Bolshevik hands;
2. to help the Czechoslovak Legion redeploy to the Western front;
3. to resurrect the Eastern Front by installing a White Russian-backed government; and
4. to secure resource-rich Siberia.

The Allies began landing at Vladivostok in Siberia in April 1918 and remained until 1925. By autumn 1918, there were 70,000 Japanese, and about 7000 other Allied troops in the region.

The Czechoslovak Legion had been a force of 40,000 ethnic Czech and Slovak volunteers in formations of the Tsarist Russian Army. In February 1918, the Bolsheviks granted the Legion permission to journey to the Western Front via Vladivostok along the Trans-Siberian Railway. After delays, the Legion left Vladivostok in September 1920. Some 60,000 soldiers and 11,000 civilians were evacuated with the Czechoslovak Legion. Many formed the core of the new Czechoslovak Army.

**Royal Australian Naval Involvement in the Russian Civil War in South Russia**

From June to November 1918, the White Russian, General Denikin, controlled South Russia between the Black and the Caspian Seas. There were several Australian advisers with the British Military Mission, one of whom commanded a company of the 7th Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment (Grey 1985).

In December 1918, an Australian destroyer, HMAS Swan, conducted a reconnaissance on behalf of the British military mission at Denikin’s headquarters at Novocherkassk to report on conditions at the ports of Mariupol and Taganrog (110 km apart on the Sea of Azov) and the surrounding country. The shallowness of Kerch Strait between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov precluded the use of anything but shallow-draught vessels.

Swan visited Kerch before proceeding to Mariupol. Commander A. G. H. Bond RN, with three Australian officers and six ratings, was travelling by train northwards along the Don River to inspect the training and the fighting some 450km north of the Sea of Azov, when a sudden break-through by the Bolshevik forces caused the abandonment of the investigation.

Returning south, they visited an ammunition factory at Taganrog, then the British Mission at Krasnodar, then rejoined Swan at Mariupol and proceeded home via Britain in January 1919.

In the summer of 1919, Denikin attempted to capture Moscow but was forced to retire in October 1919 some 360km south of Moscow and then to the Crimea by March 1920 (Gilbert 1922: 417-420).

**Allied Intervention in the Transcaucasus**

From the 19th century, Tsarist Russia had governed the Transcaucasus and had linked the oil resources of Baku on the Caspian Sea by rail and pipeline to the Black Sea at Batumi. A Russian sphere of interest in North Persia had been agreed with the British in 1908, including Russian occupation as far south as the Baghdad–Hamadan–Qasvin–Anzali road to the Caspian Sea, still held by the Tsarist Russian Caucasus Army in March 1917 (Busch 1976: 20-21), when the British Mesopotamian Army captured Baghdad. The Russians, however, had become inactive and, by summer, had abandoned the Baghdad end of the road (Bean 1937: 718-720).
The region was of extreme importance to Britain. Throughout the war, notions of a German-backed pan-Islamic alliance from the Caucasus, across the Caspian Sea and beyond, along the Russian borders of British India, disturbed British supremacy in Afghanistan and modern Pakistan (Busch 1976: 24; Lindenmayer 2018: 157). The defence of Baku would prevent that.

Further south, a 1000km gap had formed on the right flank of the British Mesopotamian Army in which Ottoman and German agents were active. There were pro-British Armenian and Assyrian Christian refugees at Urmia, and a Russian Cossack force of about 1500 men at Qasvin (Busch 1976: 29). The military solution was to limit Ottoman/German access to the western ends of the transportation routes leading towards India. The west to east Baghdad–Hamadan–Qasvin–Anzali road intersected these routes and linked with Tehran. Sufficient Allied forces to close this gap could not be spared, so raising and training local forces seemed to be the only alternative.

**Dunsterforce**

Major-General Lionel Dunsterville was appointed to lead an Allied force (‘Dunsterforce’) among whom were 40 Australians, 20 British, 41 Canadians and 10 New Zealanders, drawn from the Mesopotamian and Western Fronts, accompanied by wireless detachments in cars (Winegard 2005). Later, he acquired an infantry battalion mounted in 500 Ford cars, a squadron of cavalry, eight armoured cars, and three aircraft. The Royal Navy set up an impromptu gunboat force on the Caspian Sea to support him (Busch 1976: 44; Dunsterville 1918: 1 June).

Dunsterville needed to secure his line-of-communication along the road from Baghdad to the port of Anzali on the Caspian Sea. The road climbed for 1000km through a succession of mountain ranges and desolate regions, and was frequently raided by Ottoman or hostile Persian forces funded by German/Ottoman agents. Kurdish clans controlled all approaches. By 1 June 1918, he had disposed his force along the road and placed forward elements at Bijar, and near Tabriz which was already Ottoman held (Dunsterville 1918: 1 June).

Once the Tsarist Russians left, the Ottoman Army formed the Islamic Army of the Caucasus to advance towards Baku and mobilise Muslim supporters in the Transcaucasus. They excluded their erstwhile allies, the Germans. By July 1918, they were advancing on Baku (Busch 1976: 23).

The Germans, seeking to secure the oil supplies from Baku for themselves while preventing the Ottomans capturing the area, crossed the Black sea to Batumi on 8 June 1918 to stabilize the pro-German Democratic Republic of Georgia with a 3000-strong cavalry brigade, an infantry regiment, machine-guns and mortars, later reinforced. The Germans confronted the Ottomans crossing the Georgian frontier while advancing on Tbilisi [Tiflis], forcing them to change direction to reach Baku through Azerbaijan.

Dunsterville arrived in Baku on 17 August by sea with a battalion group and an artillery battery, but could not rally its defenders and evacuated his troops by sea on 14 September (Busch 1976: 30). The Ottomans captured Baku on 15 September.

**Australians in Dunsterforce**

Dunsterville, with his headquarters at Hamadan on the Baghdad–Caspian road, needed to pacify the surrounding region to its north. He established three combat outposts, one of which was commanded by Captain Stanley Savige MC, AIF. Each outpost blocked raids by Ottomans, Kurds and bandits, or delayed them until reinforcements could arrive. All posts had wireless detachments to summon support. Local forces were to be raised (paid with British money), roads constructed and improved, and order establish by forming a local police force. Mapping the unknown terrain was essential. The funds paid for this work enabled the local communities to resume trading and alleviate famine. Dunsterville hoped that the British would be able to advance northwards to the oil and rail lines from Baku to Batumi (Savige 1920: Ch 21 – 26).

Savige’s party of 35 reached Hamadan on 18 May 1918 and on 26 May was directed to go to Bijar, 177km from Hamadan, via Zanjan where there were two troops of British Cavalry as a ready-reaction force. Bijar (in the Kurdistan Province of modern Iran) was a suitable location to control several routes from the north. Savige’s party set about route reconnaissance, map making, famine relief, policing and the raising and training of a local Kurdish militia (Savige 1920: Ch 21).

Pacification soon turned to an operation to rescue Assyrian and Armenian refugees from Urmia, 450km north of Bijar via Quoshachay [Miandab]. This operation has been overshadowed by Australian achievements on the Western and Palestine fronts, yet, Charles Bean called it ‘as fine as any episode … in the history of this war’ (Bean 1937: 750). It is still remembered in the Assyrian communities in Australia amongst whom Savige is revered.

In July 1918, Captain Savige, two officers and 23 non-commissioned officers, were ordered to move from their post at Bijar to Urmia to bolster its Armenian, Assyrian and Russian defenders who were under Ottoman siege (Savige 1920: Ch 29). Unfortunately, the defence collapsed before Savige arrived and the city fell to the Ottoman Army on 31 July causing about 70,000 refugees to flee south pursued by Turks and Kurdish militia. The operation now became a humanitarian rescue (Lindenmayer 2018: 169-170; Savige 1920: Ch 32).

From 5 August, Savige placed two officers, six sergeants and two Lewis guns as a rearguard on the withdrawal route to move in bounds on a succession of key ridges once the rear of the long refugee column had passed. By bluffing with fire and movement, they delayed the 500 pursuing Ottomans and Kurds for about 14 days (Savige 1918; 1920: Ch 37, 38). Though many refugees died en route, Savige had saved them from massacre by getting them to Hamadan, from whence they were evacuated to a field hospital near Baghdad. There were 48,927 Assyrian survivors and many Armenians. Perhaps 30,000 were lost without trace (Lindenmayer 2018: 200).

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1. Later, Lieutenant-General Sir Stanley Savige KBE, CB, DSO, MC.
Savige was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for inspiring his men and putting ‘… heart into the frightened refugees’ (London Gazette Supplement, 4 October 1919).

After the decisive British victories at Megiddo, Palestine (25 September) and Mosul (30 October), the Ottoman army had to withdraw from the Caucasus. After the Ottoman Empire signed the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October, a British occupation force re-entered Baku. The Germans left Georgia in December 1918 and were replaced by the British 27th Division until 1920. A separate British force occupied Baku at the same time and helped establish the Azerbaijan Republic (Qasimly 2006).

Present issues

After a brief alliance with Poland, Ukraine could not prevail against Russian pressure and in 1922 became a republic of the USSR. It achieved independence again in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR.

Ongoing tension between Russia and Ukraine, however, has continued. During unrest in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, skirmishes broke out in Mariupol between Ukrainian government forces, local police, and pro-Russian militants. Russia seized the Crimea and several Australians were among the passengers and crew killed in the shooting-down of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine by pro-Russian militia. On 26 November 2018, Russia blocked the Kerch Strait preventing Ukrainian shipping from entering the Sea of Azov. Conflict between pro-Russian and Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine continues.

The USSR invaded the Transcaucasian republics in 1920 and controlled them until 1991. On 15 September 2018 at Baku, the 100th anniversary of Liberation of Baku, the 27th Division re-entered Baku. The Germans left Georgia in December 1918 and were replaced by the British 27th Division until 1920. A separate British force occupied Baku at the same time and helped establish the Azerbaijan Republic (Qasimly 2006).

The USSR invaded the Transcaucasian republics in 1920 and controlled them until 1991. On 15 September 2018 at Baku, the 100th anniversary of Liberation of Baku from ‘Armenian-Bolshevik’ forces was celebrated with the Turkish and Azerbaijani presidents being the guests of honour at a parade by the armed forces of both countries. In Armenia and Georgia, there have been periodic disputes over territory. The Assyrians remained in Iraq, never receiving territorial recognition and endured a massacre by Iraqi forces in 1933.

The Kurds continue to seek independence in the adjacent parts of four countries: Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. The Kurdish regions, however, are not only home to ethnic Kurds, but also to Arabs, Assyrians, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens. In south-eastern Turkey, an insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) seeks to liberate a Kurdish region. The PKK is listed as a terrorist group by the United States and several of its allies. Northern Syria has recently been liberated from ISIS fighters by the United States-supported Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ), but President Trump has just announced withdrawal of United States support. The Kurds now fear intervention by Turkey. In Iran, a short-lived Soviet-sponsored Kurdish republic was established in 1945-1946 around Urmia. There is now a Kurdistan province of Iran in the region of Bijar; and Iraqi Kurdistan is autonomous within the Iraqi state.

Conclusion

Hobsbawm’s ‘short’ century of conflict has not yet ended. 1991 proved to be a false dawn of peace. Conflict on the same issues in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East continues to this day. While the late Australian military historian, Jeffrey Grey, writing before the collapse of the USSR, dismissed the Russian Intervention as part of a ‘pathetic sideshow’ (Grey 1985), other historians have thought differently (Winegard 2005; Qasimly 2006). Although overshadowed by the gigantic scale of warfare during the two World Wars and some other disputes, the Russian Intervention was a substantial intervention and Australians played a significant role in it, two winning the Victoria Cross and one the Distinguished Service Order.

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Post-war operations in the Middle East

A paper based on a presentation to the Institute on 27 November 2018 by

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The Australian Imperial Force’s involvement in the Great War in the Middle East Theatre did not end with the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. There was order to be maintained in occupied territories until civil government was re-constituted. This involved the Australians in law-enforcement actions in Syria, southern Turkey, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and Gallipoli. Most Australians were repatriated home by the end of 1919.

Key words: Australian Imperial Force; World War I; Great War; 1919; Egypt; Syria; Turkey; Mesopotamia; Kurdistan; Gallipoli.

The Great War in the Middle East Theatre ended with the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918, just after the capture of Aleppo in northern Syria by the British Empire’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force, but this did not end the Australian Imperial Force’s (AIF) involvement in the Middle East. At that point, the Desert Mounted Corps (5th Indian Cavalry Division and Australian Mounted Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Chauvel) was pursuing Mustapha Kemal’s VII Army from Syria into southern Turkey.

The Middle East Armistice and its Problems

Following the armistice, General Sir Edmund Allenby, commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, gave Chauvel responsibility for administering Syria and southern Turkey, an area of 35,000 square miles including the Turkish cities of Alexandretta, Kilis, Antep, Maras, Urfa, Adana and Ras-el-Ain. As representative of the occupying power, Chauvel had huge political issues to manage, but he had limited resources. On paper, his was the most explosive of the areas under Allenby’s control – the others being Palestine and Egypt.

As an example of the issues Chauvel faced, a group of Kurdish bandits set up a roadblock on the main Aleppo-Damascus Road and proceeded to liberate merchants of their possessions. The 1st Australian Light Car Patrol was dispatched to deal with the problem. The arrival of armed cars, at high speed and using their Lewis guns, came as a nasty surprise. The bandit group was either killed or surrendered and the road reopened.

Chauvel, however, had bigger problems than bandits. The Turkish army was required to evacuate large areas of Turkey itself, but was showing signs of ignoring these armistice provisions. Chauvel’s judgement and calmness proved important. At one point, he threatened to resume the offensive against Mustapha Kemal. It was bluff, he had neither the troops nor the political support to do it.

The threat, however, led to the Turkish government removing Kemal from command of the VII Army. Later, the commander of the II Turkish army, Ali Ihsan, also became troublesome. Allenby moved Chauvel’s headquarters from Damascus to Aleppo along with the 4th Indian Cavalry Division and a new infantry brigade to reinforce him. Eventually, Allenby had to go to Constantinople personally to get the Turkish government to restrain its military. The threats and diplomacy had their effect. The Australian divisions were withdrawn to Egypt in early 1919. Chauvel operated with his Indian divisions until he himself left at the end of April.

Gallipoli and the War Graves Commission

A concern of the AIF was the care of their comrades’ graves on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Shortly after the Armistice, Chauvel despatched the 7th Australian Light Horse Regiment and New Zealand’s Canterbury Mounted Rifles to secure the peninsula, survey the cemeteries and undertake battlefield clearance (Gullet 1941: 786). These regiments were withdrawn in early 1919 when it was clear that there would be no attempt by the Turks to interfere with the cemeteries.

Also, immediately after the Armistice, Lieutenant Cyril Hughes, a civil engineer and surveyor, proceeded to Gallipoli to become Australia’s representative in the area for the Graves Registration Unit. Hughes had difficulty locating the graves. The cemetery plans contained no surveying reference points and individual graves had been identified only by wooden crosses, now gone. There were also unmarked burials and unburied remains. He surveyed accurately the area from Chatham’s post to Hill 60 to provide a baseline for the development of cemeteries.

Charles Bean returned to Gallipoli in February 1919. Hughes suggested to Bean that the whole of the Anzac area should be set aside as a great commemorative

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Australia's 1st Division in Cairo in December 1914 had encourage uprisings against British rule in Egypt. The Egyptian Revolt as Australia's representative in the area until 1937 and memorials. In 1920, the Imperial War Graves mid-1919 to design the permanent cemeteries and space. The Australian government was induced to lobby the British government to include Gallipoli in any treaties that allocated areas to the Imperial War Graves Commission (Bean 1948: 14-23)\(^1\).

The architect, Sir John Burnett, arrived on Gallipoli in mid-1919 to design the permanent cemeteries and memorials. In 1920, the Imperial War Graves Commission took over the cemeteries. Hughes continued as Australia's representative in the area until 1937 and built good relations with the Turkish government.

The Egyptian Revolt

Throughout the war, Turkey had done its best to encourage uprisings against British rule in Egypt. Australia's 1st Division in Cairo in December 1914 had deterred any uprising during Turkish attacks on the canal. In 1916, operations by the Anzac Mounted Division at Romani deterred the hoped-for uprising in Cairo. Now, in 1919, three factors came together to encourage Egyptian nationalists.

Firstly, few British troops were in evidence in major Egyptian centres and Turkish agents spread the message that Germany had defeated Britain in the war. Whilst the educated classes knew better, it suited nationalists to leave the rumour circulating. The Egyptians were also of the opinion that the Australians were essentially out-of-action and heading home – perhaps overlooking the fact that there were still four complete Australian brigades in the theatre under the command of T/Major-General Granville Ryrie. Indeed, reinforcements were still flowing to the Light Horse units in January 1919.

Secondly, the war had created tensions in Egypt's population. Britain had used 1.5 million members of the male population in the Egyptian Labour Corps. The actual recruitment had usually been left to local Egyptian dignitaries to organise which in turn was done using forced labour. Many died in service. Corruption was rampant and the average Egyptian suffered. Local officials, however, pinned the blame on Britain.

Finally, nationalist politicians believed that the 1914 declaration of a protectorate, which formally removed Egypt from the Ottoman empire, would be adjusted at the end of the war giving Egypt independence.

Nationalist leaders, such as Saad Zaghlul, agitated for an end to the protectorate and for Egyptian representation at the Paris Peace Conference. On 8 March 1919, to head off the movement and under instructions from London to take a tough stance, British administrators exiled Zaghlul to Malta. This immediately led to widespread disruption, strikes and violence, with women taking a leading role in demonstrations. The rebellion transcended religions with Muslims, Christians and Jews all taking part. An Australian, Chaplain-Colonel David Garland, was sent to negotiate with the Coptic Church without success (Garland 1919).

To control the situation, the Australian Light Horse and what remained of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were rearmed and re-horsed. The 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade under Brigadier-General Lachlan Wilson was stationed at Zagazig. Eventually, he had seven regiments under his command, three more were at Damanhur, one in Cairo, and one in upper Egypt; with two small columns being commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Foster and Lieutenant-Colonel Olden. In addition to his regiments, Wilson also had under command a Rolls-Royce armoured car and motor transport (Wilson 1919: Appendix pp. 8-22). Their role was to break up riots and protests, enforce curfews, and protect property and vital assets.

There were strikes, boycotts and attacks on communications assets including telephone, telegraph and rail. The operations began under relatively simple rules of engagement: firing on mobs, except when in absolute self-defence, was forbidden. Wilson was assigned Justice J. J. Kershaw of the Egyptian Supreme Court and a representative of the finance department, essentially as political advisers.

Some examples follow of the type of operations in which Australians became involved. Some 1000 rioters rushed a troop post of Lieutenant McGregor of the 10th Regiment at Minet el Qamh. At 10 yards, the order to fire was given and, in addition, a British aircraft overhead fired two short bursts from its machine-guns – 39 were killed, 25 were wounded, and the rioters were successfully driven off. Another 40 drowned when trying to escape across a local canal.

On another occasion, a mounted patrol cleared a section of railway track, following which a railway trolley with a Vickers machine-gun was sent along the line and was manhandled across the breaks. At one point, the trolley came in contact with a crowd of 2000 – 3000 engaged in burning a railway station. The trolley patrol ran three belts through its machine-guns and dispersed the mob after inflicting some 50 casualties. Later, orders were given that every eleventh round was to be removed from either the Vickers belt or from the Lewis gun magazine so that to continue firing would be a conscious act (Tynquin 2011).

Orders were continually tightened so that when Major James Loynes DSO, acting commanding officer of the 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment, was sent with a troop to deal with the mob ransacking a school run by an English woman, he was under instructions not to use bayonets or to shoot. The troop dismounted and went to work with rifle butts. A few minutes of ‘rough housing’ saw the rioters off.

Out in the countryside, many rioters put up Turkish flags which were immediately taken down when the mounted patrols directed the rioters to do so. Villagers often pulled up large sections of track and threw them in the local canals. The Australian approach was to round up all the village males, march them down to the canal and direct that they retrieve said railway lines and return them to wherever they had got them. On one occasion,\(^1\)

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\(^1\)Extraordinary though idea is, today, many Australians often believe that we somehow own Gallipoli, that feeling stemming from actions in these early years after the First World War.
among the locals were several upper-class Egyptians whom it was believed were responsible as the leaders in the community. The troop leader had them pushed to the canal with instructions ‘this includes you too’. General Wilson said that the villagers saw the humour of this.

By May, due to operations by the Australians in particular, along with concessions made by the British government, riots were tailing off. June was exceptionally quiet and, by July, the Light Horse was finally on its way home.

As the Egyptian Revolt was not to have prominence, no medal or clasp was ever issued for it, nor was a British General Service Medal clasp issued, unlike the clasp awarded to Kurdistan veterans. Incoming recruits, however, were made eligible for the British War Medal 1916-1918. It appears no decorations were awarded for the Egyptian Revolt, despite the work put in by people like Wilson.

Mesopotamia and Kurdistan

Australia had operated various signals troops in Mesopotamia in support of the Indian Army from 1916 to 1918. By the end of the war, the remnants of these sub-units had been combined into the 1st Australian Wireless Signal Squadron. The Australian signALLers allowed the British commander control over far-flung forces. The stations would leapfrog through each other to allow continuous communications. Often this meant that the rear station did not necessarily have an escort and had to protect itself while it caught up with the column. At the conclusion of the war with Turkey, the married personnel were repatriated but a single combined troop, now known as ‘D’ troop, numbering 52 all ranks (2 officers and 50 other ranks), remained to provide signals assistance to the British command (Anonymous 1986).

The most difficult area for the new Iraqi mandate was Kurdistan in northern Iraq bordering on Turkey and Iran. Britain had significant problems in establishing control – in part because Turkish agents were quite happy to agitate against the incoming Imperial power, but more because the Kurds saw this change as an opportunity to seek independence, as they still are today. There, too, was Turkish angst about losing this area – it is the stepping stone to Turkic peoples in Central Asia. This matter was more urgent for the Kurds as it was clear that Britain expected to establish a much more detailed local control than the Turks ever had.

On many occasions during the Kurdish revolt, the signALLers operated on their own. Between November 1918 and May 1919, the troop was fully occupied in supporting British operations in Persia and Iraq. In Iraq, there was significant construction of telegraph infrastructure. This included the construction of line to the remote central Kurdistan town of Amadiya.

By then problems had already started, primarily in Kurdistan. In late May, a Kurdish force from Iran seized the local capital, Sulimanieh, in south Kurdistan. Attempts by ground forces to break through to relieve the town failed. An Australian, Squadron Leader Edye Rolleston Manning MC, commanding officer of 6 Squadron, Royal Air Force, successfully evacuated by air the High Commissioner and his family from Sulimanieh. Manning was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.

As is common in any war, British forces have to have several disasters at the start before things get on track. The revolt in Kurdistan was no exception. In late May, Colonel Bridges, commanding a battalion group based on the 116th Mahrattas including a section of armoured cars and many T-model Fords, pushed out from Kirkuk to relieve Sulimanieh. This force was supported by a ‘D’ troop element. The theatre commander in his dispatch indicates that this was against orders (McMunn 1922). The Mahrattas regimental history claimed that no timely orders were given and the colonel was merely acting on his initiative. After establishing a base at Chemchamal, 50km short of Sulimanieh, he pushed on to Taslujeh Pass. Blocked there on 25 May, he withdrew 20km to Baysan Pass where he was forced to abandon two armoured cars and 19 Fords. Two more armoured cars were lost in rescuing Bridge’s force. In this early phase, British commanders regularly failed to occupy the high ground, thereby allowing the enemy to do so and to dominate columns. On this front, it was not until 20 June that a combined attack seizing the high ground by night forced its way through to Sulimanieh. This attack finally got south Kurdistan back under control.

The damage, however, had been done and the tribes in central Kurdistan who had been holding off, watching events, took notice that the British could be defeated. There had already been some problems in central Kurdistan. In April, in Zakho in the far west of central Kurdistan, the British political officer was murdered.

Once the telegraph line to Amadiya was completed, the Australian signals detachment there was pulled out leaving the British political officer with his two staff to monitor the situation. Two weeks later all three were murdered as they slept along with their security detail. An infantry company with an Australian Wireless station attached, was sent out to investigate. The enemy was underestimated; the force had to withdraw under heavy pressure when within 20 miles of Amadiya. The pack wireless was set up, a situation report sent, then pulled down again all within 30 minutes. The 36 miles back to base was covered in just 12 hours.

Ultimately, both the 18th and 19th Indian Divisions were committed to restoring order. In the central Kurdistan area, two large military columns were formed, each based on a brigade and supported by an Australian pack wireless station. One was to advance and seize Zakho and the second, commanded by Brigadier-General Nightingale and known as ‘Nightcol’, was tasked with retaking Soweira (Suwara or Suwarra) then moving on to Amadiya. The operation overall was under the command of Major-General Sir Robert Cassels. At Soweira on 14 August, the base camp of ‘Nightcol’ was attacked by

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*Services in Kurdistan, Australian Honoured. The Telegraph (Brisbane), Wednesday, 18 June 1924, p. 2.*
about 1000 Kurds. The camp was surrounded by bush-covered hills but had posts pushed out. Unfortunately, some of the posts had not been developed properly. The situation was touch-and-go for a while, with mountain-gun fuses set at ‘instantaneous’ (Bean 1941: 762). An Australian signaller, T/Sergeant A. T. Rodd, was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

The last operations for the squadron were in October when the situation was now under control, and British replacements had arrived. The squadron was withdrawn via Bombay in November and most Australians were home by January 1920. Unlike the Egyptian revolt, the Mesopotamia campaign qualified for the British General Service Medal 1918 – 1962 with the clasp ‘Kurdistan’. The squadron had received one Distinguished Conduct Medal, three British Meritorious Service Medals, and two Mentions-in-Despatches – not bad for a force of 52. Sir Robert Cassels was to say later that it was the wireless operations that made the offensive possible⁶.

**Chanak Crisis**

The Treaty of Sevres had left Turkey dismembered. By 1922, two Turkish governments existed. One run by the old regime headed by the sultan as a constitutional monarch from Constantinople and a de facto organisation run by Mustapha Kemal from Ankara. Kemal moved to consolidate the area under Turkish control and push out foreign forces. This meant attacking Greek-held areas in western Turkey. Kemal was said to have 60,000 to 70,000 troops at his disposal.

On 15 September 1922, the British government sent a cable to the prime ministers of Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand outlining the situation and asking whether they would like to be represented by a contingent in any action by Britain which was in the process of sending a division to join the force of the Allied commander-in-chief, General Sir Charles Harrington, in Constantinople. The aim of the exercise would be to force Kemal to negotiate. Canada and South Africa declined. This meant attacking Greek-held areas in western Turkey. Kemal was said to have 60,000 to 70,000 troops at his disposal.

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What would Australia send? The government favoured an infantry brigade whilst Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Chauvel, Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces, and Major-General Sir Granville Ryrie, assistant defence minister, believed that that would lead to the brigade disappearing into the British organisation and so believed that Australia was best served by sending a division⁷. By this time hundreds, had begun turning up at militia depots trying to enlist.

Meanwhile, a small force of Australians was already in the thick of it. Cyril Hughes, now a lieutenant-colonel, had staff of 13 soldiers, mostly engineers, which he put at the disposal of the British commander. They rebuilt a wharf at Chanak, constructed an airfield for the RAF on the Kilid Bahr plateau, laid out a military camp, and selected gun positions. On the eastern side of the narrows near Chanak, an Australian officer blew up all the Turkish ammunition dumps – the last in the face of advancing Turkish cavalry. Mustapha Kemal was reported to be ‘not amused’ (Cutlack 1924: 13).

In the end, a negotiated settlement was reached which led in 1923 to the Treaty of Lausanne and Australia’s commitment was not required.

**Conclusion**

The Australian Imperial Force’s involvement in the Great War in the Middle East Theatre did not end with the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. There were occupied territories to be administered and order to be maintained until civil government was re-constituted. This involved the Australians in law-enforcement actions in Syria, southern Turkey, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and Gallipoli. The Egyptian Revolt of 1919 was a particularly testing time. Most Australians had been repatriated home by the end of 1919.

**The Author:** Lieutenant Colonel David Deasey OAM RFD (Ret’d) is a military historian with a particular interest in the 2nd Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Great War in the Middle East Theatre (1915-1919). A former high-school teacher of modern history, he also was a citizen soldier who saw regimental service in the Royal New South Wales Regiment and later commanded the University of New South Wales Regiment. [Photo of Colonel Deasey: the author]

**References**


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⁶Cobargo Chronicle, Saturday 17 April 1920, p. 4.
⁷The Argus, Tuesday 19 September 1922, p. 7.
This paper will deal with the Treaty of Versailles and what it meant for Australia. First, though, I wish to highlight the importance of the Royal United Service Institute’s Ursula Davidson Library – which has just taken up residence in The Anzac Memorial in Sydney’s Hyde Park – and the role libraries can continue to play in modern scholarship, despite the fact that academe is undergoing its biggest change since the invention of printing some 500 years ago. Special collections, like the Ursula Davidson Library’s collection, remain a vital research resource, even though university libraries are downsizing their print-on-paper collections and research today is almost all digital.

A Traditional View of the Treaty of Versailles

In 1968, before a career in academic librarianship, I used to teach modern history at Sydney’s Cabramatta High School. I thought I knew all about the treaty of Versailles. In simple terms, I taught that:

- the treaty was responsible for the complicated web of nation states that plagues us to this day;
- the treaty was in large measure a cause of World War II;
- the treaty imposed the injustices of the Rhineland, The Saar coal mines, the Czechoslovak frontier, Danzig and the Polish Corridor, and the treatment of Austria;
- following the collapse of three great empires, the national frontiers drawn up in 1919 lasted until 1938/9 and that, with some notable changes, their influence survives to this day; and
- against the background of the then current Cold War, these arrangements contributed to anxieties that survived to that day.

In connection with the importance of understanding the treaty’s influence on today’s world, I did admit that the peacemakers’ utopian dreams were not in vain with regard to the League of Nations and that to a degree we have them to thank for the United Nations Organisation.

Yes, I did teach some positive results of the treaty, but the Australian spin I put on my teaching was that the treaty represented all that was bad in the old world; that the European Powers had ignored President Wilson’s determination to make the world safe for democracy and secure an end to war as an instrument of policy; and that the evil aspects of the treaty were not Australia’s fault – we were somehow removed from the evil process.

I taught that Lloyd George and Clemenceau made Germany pay; that Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch had predicted in 1919 that the harsh terms of the treaty would bring disastrous consequences on those who imposed them; and that John Maynard Keynes had written to Austen Chamberlain from the conference in May 1919: “We have presented a draft treaty to the Germans which contains in it much that is unjust and much that is inexpedient” (Gilbert 1964: 7). I agreed with Keynes’ claim that Versailles implemented a “Carthaginian Peace” (Keynes 1919).

I taught that the treaty created the grievances that Hitler had relied on in justifying German actions in the lead up to World War II and that he had some justification in comparing it unfavourably in its harshness to the vanquished to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Research in the Ursula Davidson Library

In the 50 years 1968–2018, not even two visits to Versailles and the Hall of Mirrors had caused me to change my view that the treaty and its sad consequences were not of Australia’s doing. Then, early this year, I was asked to review the Royal United Services Institute’s Ursula Davidson Library prior to its move to the Anzac Memorial in Sydney’s Hyde Park; and,
specifically, to prepare a paper on the Versailles Treaty and Australia. The twin tasks sent me to the shelves and the dusty stacks. What I discovered led me to revise my ideas on the Treaty of Versailles and convinced me that Australia had had a hand in the three most controversial aspects of it: reparations; mandates; and race policy; and that, taken together, these aspects influenced the coming of World War II and the nature of that world war in our region.

The books acquired by the library in the years leading up to, during and post-World War I show the development of an embryonic and enduring defence and foreign policy that the Australian prime minister, William Morris (“Billy”) Hughes, took to Versailles with significant results. They do not portray Australia as an innocent bystander!

A scan of the literature held in the Ursula Davidson Library (and it deserves much more than a scan), reveals that the defence and foreign strategic concerns Hughes inherited when he took over from Andrew Fisher, who was finding the strain of wartime administration too much, were:

- maintaining the White Australia policy;
- restricting or preventing Japanese expansion in the Pacific;
- keeping the British maritime superiority in our region, as it was considered that Australia could not be effectively defended once an enemy lodgement on the mainland had been achieved; and
- defining Australia’s place in the British Empire relationship.

These concerns were to be the driving forces behind Hughes’ significant performance at Versailles and Australia’s influence on the post-Great War world.

**Australia’s World War I Foreign Policy and its Pursuit**

Before I browsed the Royal United Services Institute’s collection, I understood that, in the words of the prime minister who took Australia to war, Andrew Fisher, we went to war in 1914 to support the mother country to the “last man and the last shilling”. After browsing, I still think family sentiment was part of it, but the rows of dusty volumes have revealed a foreign policy, that, given our position as a dominion and part of the British Empire, we perhaps were not entitled to have – it motivated our participation in the war and our belligerence at the peace conference. That policy stemmed from a fear of Japan following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. That fear was behind the creation of an Australian navy, but it was also behind a policy of keeping a strong British presence to our north and drove opposition to any British-Japanese alliance.

To visit our troops abroad and to pursue these issues, Hughes went to England in 1916. He was unsuccessful in opposing Anglo-Japanese co-operation, but, dissatisfied with British prime minister Asquith’s prosecution of the war, successfully took his ideas on total war to the British people. This ultimately gained him access to official circles and forced Asquith to include him in the delegation to the 1916 Allied Economic Conference in Paris. His successes in 1916 and the contacts he made provided a base from which to pressure British public opinion and politicians in 1919. From his 1916 visit on, Hughes operated on two levels to influence the outcome of the war for Australia. He pushed the limits imposed on dominion prime ministers in gaining access to official meetings; and he operated in the public arena to have Asquith’s and United States president Wilson’s constituents support his ideas.

Hughes’ experience at the Imperial Conference convinced him that the dominions were being kept in the dark with regard to key post-war issues and he began to build his own influence base. He returned to England for the 1918 Imperial War Conference leaving Sydney in April. He travelled by way of the United States to talk to Wilson – this annoyed the British Government which regarded itself as the conduit through which dominion governments were to talk to foreign powers. In the United States, however, Hughes did more than talk to Wilson. He talked to Wilson’s electors on the west coast, urging them to convince Wilson of the rightness of Hughes’ position on containing Japanese expansion in the Pacific and of the value of the White Australia policy.

His assessment of the situation in France after the battle of Hamel and his visit to Clemenceau in July, followed by the August battles in which Australian formations played such a significant part, convinced him that the end of the war was near, whereas most pundits were planning on the war going on into 1919. He decided to stay on in London to advance Australia’s interests at the peace conference.

On 7 October 1918, Germany made overtures for peace. On 12 October, Hughes was in Paris at the invitation of President Poincare to receive the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. In presenting it, Poincare supported a dominion presence at a future peace conference, arguing that the peace terms must be such as would command approval of all the Allies and not merely the approval of President Wilson. Hughes was able to build on the support which went back to 1916 and, along with Borden from Canada, win agreement for separate representation for the dominions at the peace conference.

This achievement of independent representation at the peace conference should not be underestimated. Before Versailles, some form of Empire federation was being discussed. It can be argued that after dominion representation at the peace conference, the Statute of Westminster was an inevitability. The copy of the Treaty of Versailles on the wall at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra is the first international agreement signed by Australia. It is important as an artefact of our independence.

**The Peace Conference**

**Reparations**

Hughes was prominent in the debates on reparations. He was vice-president of the commission of the League
that dealt with reparations, and, although Australia was not to be a major financial recipient, his oratory probably had the effect of putting pressure on Asquith to strengthen British demands. His arguments for a new post-war economic order, one which would keep Germany from resuming a dominant world economic position and regaining colonial interests and commercial and military capability in the world, were to result in such arrangements as the Polish Corridor, the separation of the Sudeten Land and other arrangements to keep Germany poor.

**Mandated territories**

Hughes demanded annexation of the occupied German colonial territories so forcefully that he came close to destroying the conference. He was opposed by Wilson because it would have given the Japanese the islands north of the equator and because it clashed with the ideals enshrined in Wilson's proposed League of Nations. An A-class and B-class of mandate were proposed by Smuts, but this proposal was rejected for application in the Pacific, with the opposition led by Hughes. Bean reports that:

“At this juncture, Lieut.-Commander John Latham, a lawyer on the staff of Sir Joseph Cook, suggested to Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary of the British Delegation and of the Council of Four, a form of mandate that should meet the views of both sides where the captured territory was remote from other powers but lay next to that of a nation to whom it was mandated: in these cases, Latham urged the mandatory nation might be allowed to apply its own laws to the territory, subject to safeguards of native interests and a prohibition on fortifying the territory.” (Bean 1946: 523)

A compromise was reached when Latham's modified C-class mandate gave Australia and New Zealand administration of the former enemy islands south of the equator. It was a mandate that Hankey assured Hughes could be regarded as ‘the equivalent’ of a 999-year lease as compared with a freehold” (Whyte 1957: 392). Australia had achieved a *cordon sanitaire.*

**Racial policy**

Because he wished to keep the mandated territories, particularly New Guinea, free of Japanese migration by imposing the White Australia policy on them, Hughes moved to block a Japanese attempt to have the principle of racial equality written into the Charter of the League of Nations. Hughes did not achieve a majority for his position, but, by threatening to appeal to voters on the United States west coast (where perception of a Japanese Pacific threat was strong) to put pressure on President Wilson, he achieved his aim.

Hughes managed to block each subsequent amendment calling for racial equality, despite the fact that he was receiving contrary advice from his own department. The Director of the Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department lamented, “How much better it would have been to accept the Japanese amendment in one of its least noxious forms … As it is, we have been perhaps the chief factor in consolidating the whole Japanese nation behind the imperialists” (Frei 1991: 99).

**Pacific Post-War Tensions**

It would be a mistake to blame all the post-war tensions in the Pacific on the Versailles arrangements. The United States sins of omission had much to do with it. The United States did not ratify the Versailles Treaty (although Wilson signed it), nor did the United Sates join the League of Nations. This left America’s attitude to the Japanese-held mandates and to Japanese settlement and militarisation of them, ambiguous. It can be argued that the United States retreat into isolationism was a greater threat to peace, especially in the Pacific, than any of the Versailles Treaty arrangements.

Apportioning the blame for moving Japan from the position of ally in the First World War to an opponent in the Second World War is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is my contention that the volumes in the Ursula Davidson collection show it began in Paris in 1919 and that Australia was involved in the process. Certainly, by 1936, Lieutenant Commander Tota Ishimaru’s book *Japan Must Fight Britain* (Ishimaru 1936) had been translated into English and Japan's grievances were there for all to see.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have tried to correct the impression that the sins of Versailles were all the fault of the European powers and to show that, as far as they affected our part of the world, we were more than complicit. But I would not like to leave the discussion in the negative. Sixty thousand Australians had given their all for the ideals enshrined in the charter of the League of Nations. Hughes and his team performed brilliantly in contributing to Australia's first international agreement which Lloyd George, speaking in London in June 1923, described as:

“This great international instrument. It is the most important document of modern times. It has reshaped for better or for worse much of the geography of Europe. It has resurrected dead and buried nationalities. It constitutes the deed of manumission of tens of millions of Europeans who, up to the year of victory, 1918, were the bondsmen of other races. It affects profoundly the economies of the world; it contains clauses upon the efficacy of which may depend the very existence of our civilisation.” (Lloyd George 1923: 207)

On balance, almost 100 years on, Australians should be proud of their country’s contribution to the first international agreement to which our country put its name. In being proud, however, we should realise that at Versailles we:

- established ourselves as a nation with an independent foreign policy;
• gained a strategic advantage to our north that, in the shape of the mandated territory of New Guinea and, now an independent nation, Papua New Guinea, is with us to this day;
• contributed our share to the reparations nightmare that was a cause of World War II; and
• offended Japan to a point that may have contributed to that nation being on the other side in the next conflict.

The Author: Dr Colin F. Baker RFD is a member of the Institute’s Special Interest Group on Military History and is one of the Institute’s part-time librarians. A one-time high-school teacher of modern history with a doctorate in education, he is a former librarian of the Armidale College of Advanced Education and later of the Papua New Guinea University of Technology, Lae. He is also a former citizen soldier who was commissioned through the Sydney University Regiment, later transferred to the Royal Australian Armoured Corps and, as a lieutenant colonel, commanded the 12th/16th Hunter River Lancers. [Photo of Dr Baker: Colonel J. M. Hutcheson, MC]

BOOK REVIEW:

The unit guide: the Australian Army 1939-1945
by Graham McKenzie-Smith


Over 725,000 Australian men and women joined the Australian Army in World War II and served in one or more of the 5700 separate units which were formed in the Australian Imperial Force and the other Australian Military Forces. As well as the infantry, armour and artillery units, there were engineer, forestry, farming, transport, workshop, medical, survey, dental, postal, records and war graves units, as well as butchers, bakers and leave train cooking sections.

Only 409 (7 per cent) of these units have any published unit history and until now the descendants of these proud servicemen and servicewomen have had nowhere to go to find out what their ancestor did during the war.

The Unit Guide, in a six-volume boxed set, seeks to fill this gap with more than 5500 profiles of units in the Australian Army during the war (which between them had over 13,700 unit names). Each profile covers what is known of the unit's formation, role, organisation, movements, operations and place in the Army's hierarchy, including references to the unit's war diary at the Australian War Memorial and an extensive bibliography.

Further, there are orders of battle for most of Australia's significant campaigns or locations defended by Australian troops – such as the defence of New South Wales (February 1942), the siege of Tobruk, the 'Bird' forces captured by the Japanese, units on the Kokoda Trail, operations in Borneo, and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, Japan (April 1946), which will be invaluable to military historians and researchers. It is user friendly with comprehensive indices designed for readers without a military background.

In his foreword, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, says "There is a place for The Unit Guide on the shelves of all secondary school, local and state libraries, RSLs, on genealogists' and military historians' shelves, and among the great history collections of this country".

Graham McKenzie-Smith is a retired forester who has been researching Australia's military history since his early career in Papua New Guinea. The 35 years of research behind The Unit Guide saw Graham examine all unit war diaries at the Australian War Memorial and many other sources to ensure it is as complete as the data allow. Graham's other books include the Australia's Forgotten Army series, books on the defence of Western Australia, and Army Engineers in Western Australia.

A reference work without peer, The Unit Guide will assist military historians, researchers, genealogists, history buffs and, most importantly, the general public, to navigate their way through the history of a large and complex organisation.

Marcus Fielding
OBITUARY

Major-General Gordon L. Maitland AO OBE RFD ED

An eminent banker and citizen-soldier, when he died on 18 October 2018 aged 92 years, Gordon Lindsay Maitland was an Honorary Life Member and Councillor Emeritus of the Institute, who had been its President from 1995 – 1998, and for many years had been the doyen of the veteran community in Sydney.

Gordon Maitland was born in Sydney on 25 August 1926. After leaving school, he joined the Commonwealth Bank and began part-time economics studies at the University of Sydney.

In 1944, aged 18, he enlisted as a private in the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (AIF). He was posted to Intelligence and undertook a Japanese language course at Point Cook. Following the Japanese surrender, in September 1945 now 19-years-old, he was deployed to the Netherlands East Indies to locate, identify and question potential Japanese war criminals. In February 1946, he returned to Australia to be an interpreter at the Darwin war crimes trials. On 19 August 1947, now a sergeant, he was demobilised. He resumed his banking career in the Commonwealth Bank and, in 1948, married Dorothy Gunn who would be his wife for 69 years. They would have three children, six grandchildren and seven great grandchildren.

Gordon became a respected banker. He rose through the ranks of the Commonwealth Bank, eventually becoming chief manager. He guided the bank’s lending business, particularly home loans, transformed its image via a public relations campaign and oversaw the introduction of automatic teller machines. Following retirement from the bank, he became chief executive of the Royal Agricultural Society of New South Wales and became widely respected throughout the state’s agricultural community.

Gordon is arguably better known for his parallel career as a citizen soldier. When the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) were raised in 1948, Gordon joined the 45th Battalion, St George Regiment, at Arncliffe. He was commissioned in the battalion and served with it for 12 years, then transferred to the Royal New South Wales Regiment after it was formed on 1 July 1960. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1962 and appointed second-in-command of the 3rd Battalion, Royal New South Wales Regiment (Battle Group), and then, from 1965 to 1968, was commanding officer of the 4th Battalion, Royal New South Wales Regiment. For this service, he was appointed an Officer in the Military Division of the Order of Australia (AO).

In 1969, he was a CMF observer for a month attached to the 9th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, in South Vietnam. Staff appointments followed, including service as aide-de-camp to two governors-general. In 1974, on promotion to major-general, Gordon became commander of the 2nd Division. In 1978, he became Inspector-General of the Army Reserve (the re-named CMF) and, from 1979 to 1982, Chief of the Army Reserve, a posting that coincided with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and an expansion of the Reserve from a strength of 20,000 to 30,000. For this service, he was appointed an Officer in the Military Division of the Order of Australia (AO).

After retiring from the Army, he became Regimental Colonel of the Royal New South Wales Regiment and, after relinquishing that role, in 1989 represented the Regiment in Wales at ceremonial activities marking the tercentenary of an allied regiment, the Royal Regiment of Wales. He also turned his attention to military history, writing six books on Australian Army history, most notably a two-volume battle history of the Royal New South Wales Regiment and a separate volume detailing the deeds of each of the Regiment’s 24 Victoria Cross winners. In researching and writing these books, he was ably assisted by his wife Dorothy and by the librarian of the Royal United Services Institute, Ursula Davidson.

Gordon had joined the Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales in 1951, and it had become a life-long commitment which included service as a Councillor, Vice-President and President (1995 – 1998). The culmination of his presidency was his leading of a tour by Institute members of the Great War battlefields of northern France and Flanders in July 1998, coinciding with the 80th anniversary of the Battle of le Hamel (4 July1918) and the launch of the allied counter-offensive at Amiens on 8 August 1918. He subsequently served on the Institute’s Council as a Past-President for another decade, delivering the Blamey Oration in 2005, before becoming a Councillor Emeritus, a role in which he continued to counsel and support the president of the day. For his sustained distinguished service to the Institute, he was elected an Honorary Life Member.

Gordon also supported many veterans’ organisations, especially ones involved with commemoration of Australia’s sacrifice in war. He had attended his first Anzac Day Dawn Service aged 14 and towards the end of his life would establish the Sydney Anzac Day Dawn Service Trust, the Battle for Australia Committee and the Families and Friends of the First AIF. Other organisations he supported included the Military History Society of New South Wales and the Centenary of Anzac Advisory Council.

He was farewelled with a military funeral at St James’ Anglican Church, Sydney, on 29 October 2018, attended by the Governor-General and the Governor of New South Wales. It was a dignified occasion befitting an eminent citizen, soldier and servant of Australia.

David Leece
This impressively researched book deals with the origins and development of Australia’s intelligence services from Federation to 1945. As well as covering the better-known organisations and their work, Dr Fahey reveals the birth of Australia’s political intelligence capabilities – initially directed at the French and British in the Pacific – and the intriguing ‘Wanetta’ Organisation. Operating under the cover of a legitimate pearling company, its luggers ranged freely throughout the Netherlands East Indies reporting on the activities of German agents during World War I.

Dr Fahey’s research provides greater depth to our knowledge and understanding of the efforts of Australia’s navy and army to develop and refine their capabilities in human intelligence and the new art and science of signals intelligence during and post-World War I. Early successes are chronicled, including the breaking of German codes by the Navy and the shaky start to the Royal Australian Navy’s Coast Watcher Service, along with failures as Australia struggled with a distinct lack of central guidance which might have created a national intelligence capability before World War II. The problem was not confined to this country as the story of wasteful United States inter-service rivalry and intransigence throughout the war demonstrates.

The energetic and resourceful empire-building Director of Naval Intelligence, Commander Rupert Long, proved to be one of the pivots towards better co-ordination and development of Australian service intelligence capabilities and of co-ordination with our Allies. The development of Army capabilities from a slow start are highlighted, as is the awakening of Royal Australian Air Force interest in the field. However, Dr Fahey is commendably forthright in dismissing the claims of the Services Reconnaissance Department of General MacArthur’s Allied Intelligence Bureau to any meaningful contribution to the war effort in the South West Pacific Area. In short, the Japanese ran rings around them.

It comes as little surprise that Australia’s political intelligence agencies and politicians themselves proved inept in protecting classified information during World War II. Even parts of the Allied military hierarchy had similar difficulties – General MacArthur was a principal offender in releasing the precious ULTRA information indiscriminately. The system for using signals intelligence in ways that would not reveal to the enemy that their codes had been compromised was not standardised amongst the Allies until 1943, and these rules led to ULTRA being denied to Australian political leaders and government departments. This lax attitude towards keeping Allied secrets secret was to have ramifications for the nation immediately following the end of the war.

Some of Dr Fahey’s conclusions are open to discussion. Navy, with its Coast Watchers in place, its sponsorship of codebreaking through the Special Intelligence Bureau from 1941 and its leadership of the Combined Operations Intelligence Centre was hardly ‘unprepared’ for hostilities. The only game in town until the Army got itself organised, the claim that Navy ‘picked the wrong horse’ in throwing its lot in with the United States Navy-dominated FRUMEL ignores the fact that in early 1942 there was no other organisation with which it could co-operate. Navy also supported the formation of MacArthur’s United States Army-dominated Central Bureau from July 1942 in Brisbane, but FRUMEL’s early successes against Japanese advances in the period May-July 1942 were crucial to the course of the war. Central Bureau’s days of glory came later, from 1944 onwards.

The narrative seems to end quite abruptly. It would have been useful had the author provided a short chapter describing the dissolution of the Allied intelligence organisations in 1945 and the establishment of the Australian Defence Signals Bureau in 1947. This might also have included a brief description of Australian accession to the ‘Five Eyes’ signals intelligence arrangements resulting from the development of our national capabilities and contributions throughout World War II. This information is buried in Chapter 21 within a discussion of the role of Australian Lieutenant Colonel ‘Mick’ Sanford of Central Bureau in negotiations with the British, but he was far from the only actor in this important turning point in Australian intelligence history.

I have difficulty with the book’s title. Most of the activities described in it are not in the nature of espionage. Exploiting information freely provided by an organisation of interest through electro-magnetic emissions is intelligence collection – just as your favourite Web browser exploits information you provide when you log on and your local supermarket collects information on you when you swipe their loyalty card. This isn’t ‘spying’, but the word ‘Spies’ quite possibly might generate more sales of Dr Fahey’s otherwise excellent work. I commend it to lay people and professionals alike.

Ian Pfennigwerth
Beyond the Beach addresses the Allied bombing campaign against German forces in France during World War II. The author focuses on the two phases of the Allied bombing campaign: attacks primarily against airfields, ports – including U-boat pens – and industry (strategic bombing campaign); and the bombing effort in preparation and support for the D-Day landings when rail yards, bridges and towns inland from the invasion beaches were targeted (tactical bombing campaign).

The author is Dr Stephen Bourque, a professor emeritus at the United States Army Command and General Staff College. After 20 years of enlisted and commissioned service in the United States Army, he obtained his PhD at Georgia State University and, since then, has taught at several military and civilian schools and universities, including the School of Advanced Military Studies.

In addressing the first phase of the bombing campaign, the author addresses the issue of casualties amongst the French population. He questions why official histories are silent on this matter and why fellow historians have not previously addressed this aspect of the bombing campaign.

United States doctrine identified a strategic bombing strategy against German military power; however, it did not address the use of heavy bomber aircraft against an enemy occupying a friendly state (which France was) – nor did the British doctrine. Moreover, the technology of the time did not enable bomber crews to achieve pinpoint accuracy when attacking targets.

The author cites strategic bombing campaign planning documents that indicated that attacks, particularly against railway marshalling yards and bridges within townships, would result in significant civilian casualties.

When addressing the issue of civilian casualties, he names them, quotes them, notes their ages and family dispositions, describes their situations and their tragedies. In doing so, he puts a human face to the results of the bombing campaigns, highlighting that fighting forces were not the only ones to be sacrificed in the quest for victory. While this is a powerful way to demonstrate the high price paid by the French population, it tends to be overpowering and harrowing.

The reader might gain the impression that the author rails against the razing of towns, killing innocent civilians along with the destruction of national infrastructure. However, in doing so, he acknowledges that the Allies were faced with overwhelming challenges and provides a balanced viewpoint when considering the necessity to wage war against an enemy that resided among the French population.

However, Stephen Bourque does rail strongly against the lack of extant documented history outside France regarding the loss of some 60,000-70,000 French men, women and children who were killed during the campaign to liberate their country. He notes in many parts of the book that the after-raid reporting, and indeed, the post-war reporting of the bombing campaign against France, is silent on the casualties suffered by the French and the damage to their infrastructure and their national historical treasures.

In addressing the tactical bombing campaign in support of the Allied invasion and subsequent ground operations, the book also explores the relationship between ground and air operations and the air operation’s effects on the French population. The use of strategic bomber forces in tactical support of troops on the ground and against German defences at Normandy resulted in massive damage to French towns, killing many of their occupants. General Eisenhower directed the use of these air forces at the request of his land commanders and against the will of the leaders of the strategic bombing forces – Harris and Spaatz.

As a sidenote to history, the author observes that historians have virtually ignored the bombing of the invasion beaches and the surrounding environs in what was the greatest air campaign in history. Some 12,600 aircraft attacked targets in France and Belgium, while 1130 aircraft attacked one beachhead battery. Appreciating the size of the bombing forces enables the reader to better understand the scope of damage inflicted upon the French population.

Indeed, this is the purpose of his book. It is revealed in his commentary regarding the “missing narrative” of this phase of the war and the lack of awareness of the vast majority of people outside France and that historians have not yet adequately redressed this matter.

Given a difficult operational environment, the Allied leaders were faced with a significant dilemma – to stop German reinforcements travelling thorough French towns and using French railways and roads from reaching the battlefields of Normandy and jeopardizing the invasion. That goal was attained and decisive German reinforcements never reached the beaches – but at a terrible cost.

Beyond the Beach is very well written, expertly researched and, while written with passion, is well balanced. It challenges histories of D-Day that ignore the bombing campaigns – campaigns which contributed directly to the success of the landings and subsequent breakout of forces into France; and it confronts the reader, documenting the terrible casualties and immense damage wrought upon the French population by the bombing. The book is well-suited for students of the application of air power.

Bob Treloar
Daesh describes the rise and fall of Islamic State’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria and also the global spread of franchise terrorism under the Islamic State (Daesh) banner between 2006 and 2017.

The author, Anthony Tucker-Jones, for the past 15 years the terrorism and security correspondent for The Journal of International Security, is the author of three previously-published books on the rise of militant Islam and the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This well-researched book reflects his deep knowledge of his subject.

Islamic State’s origins can be traced to the formation of al-Qaeda-in-Iraq by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004, who pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq metamorphosed into Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in 2006, following the death of al-Zarqawi and a split with bin Laden, who considered ISI’s radical use of terror to be counter-productive in the global public relations war and opposed its targeting of the fellow-Muslim Shia in Iraq.

Islamic State is one of numerous Islamic militant groups around the world which aspire to the creation of Islamic, as opposed to secular, states. They see Islam as a political doctrine. They believe Islamic law (Sharia) should be state law and the global Muslim community (Ummah) should be joined irrespective of geopolitical boundaries.

The remnants of al-Qaeda-in-Iraq gained a new leader in 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In 2013, he merged his forces in Iraq and Syria with ISI to create the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh (the term used by Middle Eastern countries as it is linguistically distanced from Islam). In 2014, al-Baghdadi assembled an army without fanfare and then launched a surprise offensive in northern Iraq and eastern Syria. After capturing Falluja (Iraq), Raqqa (Syria) and Mosul (Iraq), and destroying six Iraqi infantry divisions and a motorised division in the process, al-Baghdadi declared the Islamic State caliphate from the Grand Mosque in Mosul on 29 June. Tikrit and Sinjar (both Iraq) and their surrounding areas were soon added to the caliphate, with Daesh waging genocide against the Yazidi people in the Sinjar area. Falluja and Ramadi north-west of Baghdad were added to the caliphate in May 2015.

In 2015, the Iraqi government, now recovered from its surprise, began the fightback, as did government and opposition forces in Syria. First, Kobane fell to the Syrian Kurds (March); and then Tikrit (April) and Sinjar (November) were recaptured by Iraqi government forces. In 2016, Iraqi government forces drove Daesh from Ramadi (February) and Falluja (June). In 2017, Iraqi government forces drove Daesh from Mosul (June); and a coalition of Free Syrian forces drove Daesh from Raqqa (October). On 21 November 2017, victory was declared over Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, although isolated pockets remained holding territory in parts of Syria, as they continue to do to this day.

Tucker-Jones states that the legacy of the Islamic State caliphate is one of barbarism. Daesh was intent on plunging the captured territories back into the Middle Ages. It enforced strict Sharia law, conducted appalling human rights abuses and refused to grant protection to Shia or Yazidis, let alone non-Muslim religious minorities in the territories it ruled. As the fate of Palmyra demonstrates, Daesh also destroyed Syria’s ancient archaeological sites because it saw them as idolatrous – it also raised much-needed funds from sale of looted artefacts.

During the years of the caliphate and subsequently, Islamic State has inspired the global spread of franchise terrorism under its banner. The book enumerates multiple examples from Australia (e.g. the 2014 Lindt café siege), Britain (especially among ex-patriot Pakistani communities in London and Birmingham), Canada and Europe (especially among ex-patriot north African communities in France, Belgium and Germany). The book also describes the phenomenon of foreign fighters (‘holy war tourists’) who have flooded into the war zones and then, if they survived, have returned as trained and experienced fighters to their homelands, either for a quiet life or to cause more harm. I was surprised, though, that no mention is made of the Islamic State-inspired uprising in Mindanao in 2017 where the town of Marawi was captured and held by Islamic State in the Philippines for some six months.

Tucker-Jones constructs his narrative around an intermixing of multiple themes and a chronological recounting of events. I found this confusing and would have preferred a chronological approach within defined themes. I also found the lack of punctuation and typographic errors disconcerting in many places. While the book has five very usefulappendices, a selected bibliography and an index, it lacks references and footnotes, which reduces its value for researchers. Further, it does not draw any overall conclusions or derive any lessons from the evidence amassed.

Those limitations notwithstanding, this short book presents the story of the rise and fall of the Islamic State caliphate and its ongoing global legacy of terrorism dispassionately and with apparent accuracy. I commend it to anyone interested in the topic.

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